Spousal Support Disorder: An Overview of Problems in Current Alimony Law by McCoy, Jennifer L.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 2 Article 5
2005
Spousal Support Disorder: An Overview of
Problems in Current Alimony Law
Jennifer L. McCoy
1245u90u@u.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jennifer L. McCoy, Spousal Support Disorder: An Overview of Problems in Current Alimony Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2005) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol33/iss2/5
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
SPOUSAL SUPPORT DISORDER:  
AN OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS IN CURRENT ALIMONY LAW 
 
Jennifer L. McCoy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 33 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WINTER 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 2
 
Recommended citation: Jennifer L. McCoy, Spousal Support Disorder: An Overview of 
Problems in Current Alimony Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 501 (2005).  
 SPOUSAL SUPPORT DISORDER: AN OVERVIEW OF 
PROBLEMS IN CURRENT ALIMONY LAW 
JENNIFER L. MCCOY* 
 I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................  501 
 II. THE HISTORY OF DIVORCE AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT LAW ..................................  503 
A. English Divorce Law and the Origins of Spousal Support........................  504 
B. Spousal Support Law in the United States ...............................................  505 
 III. SYSTEMS OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT ........................................................................  506 
A. Permanent Alimony: The Earliest System .................................................  506 
B. Reimbursive and Compensatory Support: The Middle Systems................  508 
1. Principles of the American Law Institute ............................................  509 
2. The Likely Impact on Spousal Support if ALI’s Principles Are 
Adopted ................................................................................................  509 
C. Rehabilitative Support: The Current Trend ..............................................  511 
D. Reorientation and Bridge-the-Gap Support...............................................  512 
E. Property Division in Lieu of Spousal Support?..........................................  513 
 IV. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH SPOUSAL SUPPORT LAW .........................................  513 
A. Spousal Support Law Lacks Consistency ..................................................  514 
B. Devastating Effects of Spousal Support Law on Women ...........................  516 
C. Spousal Support Law Is Often Unjust.......................................................  519 
D. Spousal Support Orders May Be a Form of Involuntary Servitude ..........  521 
 V. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT SPOUSAL SUPPORT PROBLEM .............  521 
 VI. COMMENT ON PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS THAT WAIVE RIGHTS TO  
SPOUSAL SUPPORT ............................................................................................  523 
 VII. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  525 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Marriage has never been a relationship based solely on love and 
companionship—it has always primarily been an economic 
institution.1 In this institution, husbands and wives contribute to the 
marital union by earning wages, sharing resources, and making joint 
decisions regarding careers, purchases, and investments.2 Thus, 
some consider marriage an “economic partnership.”3 Although the 
term “partnership” suggests gender equality between husbands and 
wives,4 the term is misleading because partners to a marriage are 
typically not economically equal.5 A happy marriage may mask this 
inequality, but it becomes openly evident upon divorce.  
                                                                                                                      
 *     J.D. Candidate, Florida State University College of Law, May 2006. 
 1. Margorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club—Examining the 
Financial [In]Security of Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 309, 345 
(1999); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
307, 362 (2004).  
 2. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 362-63. 
 3. Engel, supra note 1, at 345. 
 4. Id. at 345-46. 
 5. Id. at 364. 
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 Statistics show that nearly half of all married couples will 
eventually divorce.6 Ideally, upon divorce a court divides the couple’s 
property—such as the marital home, personal property, and financial 
assets—in the most equitable manner possible. Such division should 
permit the spouses to make a clean, final break from each other and 
from the marital union. However, because most divorcing couples do 
not possess valuable property, financial assets that can be divided,7 
or only possess intangible marital assets that cannot be equitably 
divided,8 a court will frequently order one spouse to make monthly 
support payments to the other to supplement the property division. 
Often, this award of spousal support becomes more important to the 
recipient than the property settlement.9 
 Spousal support, also known as alimony or maintenance,10 is 
designed to balance the effects of divorce11 by examining the earning 
capacity and future needs of each spouse12 and by providing financial 
support to the spouse who is more economically dependent.13 Much 
controversy surrounds this area of the law—spousal support “has 
been a source of much inconsistency among trial courts, unhappiness 
among litigants, and conflict among critics.”14 Most family law 
attorneys agree that spousal support presents the largest 
impediment to settling divorces, and support cases are among the 
most appealed.15 
 The purpose of this Comment is to inform readers about the 
problems inherent in modern spousal support law and to suggest a 
                                                                                                                      
 6. ROSE M. KREIDER & JASON M. FIELDS, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF 
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 18 
(2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-80.pdf (“About 50 percent of 
first marriages for men under age 45 may end in divorce, and between 44 and 52 percent of 
women’s first marriages may end in divorce for these age groups.”); see also PETER N. 
SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 771 (1st ed. 1993). 
 7. See Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: Would Adoption of 
the ALI Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119, 126, 128 
(2001). 
 8. Michelle Murray, Alimony as an Equalizing Force in Divorce, 11 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 313, 318 (2000). 
 9. Garrison, supra note 7, at 128. 
 10. Mary Frances Lyle & Jeffrey L. Levy, From Riches to Rags: Does Rehabilitative 
Alimony Need to Be Rehabilitated?, 38 FAM. L.Q. 3 (2004). 
 11. Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying an Income 
Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 36 (2001). 
 12. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
75, 99 (2004). 
 13. Victoria M. Ho & Jennifer L. Johnson, Overview of Florida Alimony, FLA. B.J., 
Oct. 2004, at 71, 71. 
 14. Megan A. Drefchinski, Comment, Out with the Old and In with the New: An 
Analysis of Illinois Maintenance Law Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and a 
Proposal for Its Replacement, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 581, 613 (2003). 
 15. Twila B. Larkin, Guidelines for Alimony: The New Mexico Experiment, 38 FAM. 
L.Q. 29, 29 (2004). 
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possible solution to these problems. Part II describes the history of 
spousal support, commencing with its origins in England and ending 
with modern trends in American support law. Part III provides brief 
overviews of many different types of spousal support currently 
available to divorced couples—including permanent support, 
reimbursement and compensatory support, rehabilitative support, 
reorientation support, bridge-the-gap support, and models of spousal 
support created by the American Law Institute and Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act. Part IV discusses many of the problems 
inherent in the modern system of spousal support, such as its 
devastating effects on women, its lack of clarity and consistency, and 
its frequent abuse by recipients. Part V presents a possible solution 
to these problems in the form of a model spousal support system 
designed to meet the needs of the supported spouse while minimizing 
the burden of paying on the supporting spouse. Part VI provides a 
brief comment on premarital agreements that waive the rights to 
spousal support. Part VII concludes the Comment by refuting 
general criticisms of spousal support, reiterating its purpose, and 
predicting the future direction of this area of law. 
II.   THE HISTORY OF DIVORCE AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT LAW 
 The modern American system of spousal support is based on the 
early English model of alimony.16 In England, alimony stemmed from 
the laws of coverture.17 Under the doctrine of coverture, marriage 
merged a wife’s legal identity with that of her husband, creating a 
united legal identity.18 When a couple married, the husband gained 
control of his wife’s assets, including all property she owned prior to 
the marriage.19 The wife also “transferred to her husband her ability 
to hold real property, sign contracts, and keep any earnings.”20 In 
return, the husband incurred a legal duty and a moral obligation to 
protect and financially support his wife.21  
 This legal duty, known as the duty of support, arose from the 
marital relationship itself and was imposed regardless of the wife’s 
                                                                                                                      
 16. Collins, supra note 11, at 30. 
 17. Id. at 29. 
 18. Id. at 40; Lara Lenzotti Kapalla, Comment, Some Assembly Required: Why States 
Should Not Adopt the ALI’s System of Presumptive Alimony Awards in Its Current Form, 
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 207, 211. 
 19. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 211. 
 20. Id. Because the doctrine of unity prevented married women from holding 
property, signing contracts, partaking in professions, or keeping their own earnings, a 
spousal support system was necessary for the survival of women who were separated from 
their husbands. Collins, supra note 11, at 29.  
 21. Collins, supra note 11, at 29; Kapalla, supra note 18, at 211; Twila L. Perry, The 
“Essentials of Marriage”: Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 1, 10 (2003). 
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premarital wealth.22 It required the husband to provide his wife with 
material support and the “necessaries” of life, such as food, clothing, 
and shelter.23 In return, it required the wife to provide her husband 
with a duty of service, such as housework, childcare, and 
companionship.24 The legal duty of support helps explain the origins 
of alimony, discussed in the next subsection.  
A.   English Divorce Law and the Origins of Spousal Support 
 Prior to 1857, England applied two types of marital dissolution.25 
The first type of divorce was known as “absolute” divorce.26 An 
absolute divorce “actually severed the marital bond.”27 Ecclesiastical 
courts could not grant this type of divorce. Only Parliament could 
grant an absolute divorce, and it was typically granted only to 
wealthy couples.28 
 The second, more common type of divorce was known as a divorce 
from bed and board.29 This type of divorce was similar to today’s 
notion of legal separation—the court granted the spouses the right to 
live apart, but the marital relationship was left intact.30 Since the 
couple technically remained married, their physical separation did 
not end the husband’s control of his wife’s assets, and the wife was 
not permitted to regain control of her own assets.31 Without any form 
of financial support, the wife had difficulty surviving.32 To solve this 
problem, courts conditioned divorces from bed and board on the 
husband’s promise to continue paying for his wife’s expenses 
pursuant to the duty of support.33 Thus, this created an early system 
of “alimony.”34  
                                                                                                                      
 22. Kapalla, supra note 18, 211-12. 
 23. Perry, supra note 21, at 11. 
 24. Id. at 3.  
 25. Collins, supra note 11, at 28.  
 26. Id.   
 27. Id.    
 28. Mavis Maclean, From Advocacy to Management in Divorce: A Women’s Issue?, 2 
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 53, 54 (1995). 
 29. Collins, supra note 11, at 28. Divorce from bed and board could only be granted by 
English “ecclesiastical courts from the mid-twelfth until the mid-nineteenth centuries.” Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 211-12. 
 32. Id. at 212.  
 33. Collins, supra note 11, at 29; see Brett R. Turner, Spousal Support in Chaos, FAM. 
ADVOC., Spring 2003, at 14, 15 (“Marriages were expected to last forever and could be 
ended only on grounds of fault. Since women usually did not and often could not find 
employment, the wife had a much higher standard of living while married than she could 
ever have on her own. When the marriage had to end because of the husband’s misconduct, 
the wife was entitled to the benefit of her bargain—the standard of living she enjoyed 
during the marriage.”). 
 34. The term “alimony” has been replaced by more modern terms, such as 
“maintenance” and “spousal support.” Larry R. Spain, The Elimination of Marital Fault in 
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 By the mid-nineteenth century, England had enacted universally 
accessible civil divorce statutes,35 so divorce from bed and board 
became obsolete. However, the concept of alimony was so firmly 
entrenched in the law that courts continued awarding it even in 
cases where marriages were officially terminated.36 
B.   Spousal Support Law in the United States 
 The American system of alimony was closely modeled on the 
English system.37 Courts first began awarding alimony during 
colonial times.38 Pennsylvania, for example, required husbands to 
agree to continue supporting their wives as a condition of receiving a 
divorce because wives had no other methods to support themselves.39 
In 1852, states began enacting the Married Women’s Property Acts, 
which permitted divorced women to regain control of property they 
owned prior to marriage.40 After the enactment of such laws, the idea 
of alimony and the notion that a husband’s duty of support should 
continue after divorce no longer seemed necessary.41 Nevertheless, 
the concept of alimony was as deeply rooted in American law as it 
was in English law, so courts continued to require husbands to 
support their wives after divorce.42 Now, with the large number of 
women participating in the workforce and the increased employment 
opportunities available to women, alimony seems even less 
necessary.  
                                                                                                                      
Awarding Spousal Support: The Minnesota Experience, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 861, 866 
(2001). 
 35. Collins, supra note 11, at 30.  
 36. Id.   
 37. Perry, supra note 21, at 23. 
 38. Collins, supra note 11, at 30. Although the colonies granted divorces, they 
remained rare. In fact, Massachusetts and Connecticut were the only colonies to grant 
more than a handful of divorces throughout the eighteenth century. Id. at 30-31. 
 39. Id. at 31. Underlying this rationale was the belief that if husbands did not 
continue supporting their ex-wives, the burden of their support would fall upon society. 
 40. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 212. For example, the New Jersey Married Women’s 
Property Act stated: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, 
That the real and personal property of any female who may hereafter marry, 
and which she shall own at the time of marriage, and the rents, issues, and 
profits thereof, shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable 
for his debts, and shall continue her sole and separate property, as if she were 
a single female. 
Chapter CLXXI: An Act for the Better Securing the Property of Married Women, in ACTS OF 
THE SEVENTY-SIXTH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 407 (1852), 
http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/njwomenshistory/Period_3/womenspropact.htm. 
 41. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 212.  
 42. Id. As a fundamental matter of constitutional law, spousal support is no longer 
reserved for just wives—courts can now order support for husbands as well. See Orr v. Orr, 
440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
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 Perhaps the concept of spousal support has always been 
controversial because no reason has ever been provided to adequately 
explain why one spouse should be forced to continue supporting the 
other after the termination of the marital relationship.43 Several 
theories have been advanced, but none are convincing. For example, 
one theory posits that courts awarded alimony in the past based on 
the belief that women could not support themselves outside the 
home.44 Another theory suggests that courts did not want “innocent” 
wives to suffer financial difficulty if their husbands breached the 
marital contract.45 Now, spousal support is based on the notion that a 
couple should not be able to completely sever their economic ties if 
doing so would leave one spouse financially devastated.46 However, 
none of these theories have articulated a clear reason why the 
economic burden of supporting a needy spouse should “fall on a 
former spouse, rather than on family members or on society as a 
whole.”47 
 Now that the history of spousal support has been addressed, it is 
necessary to discuss the different types of support currently awarded 
in America. 
III.   SYSTEMS OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
 Currently, American courts award different types of spousal 
support. These include permanent alimony, reimbursive support, 
compensatory support, rehabilitative support, reorientation support, 
and bridge-the gap support. The type of support awarded depends on 
the laws of the state where the recipient lives, and many states offer 
multiple support options. As the following subsections will 
demonstrate, support awards have progressed from permanent 
payments to compensation-based payments and finally to the 
currently favored temporary rehabilitative payments. 
A.   Permanent Alimony: The Earliest System 
 The earliest type of spousal support was known as permanent 
alimony.48 Courts typically awarded this type of support to full-time 
homemakers after the dissolution of long-term marriages.49 The 
amount of the award was based on “the needs of the receiving spouse 
                                                                                                                      
 43. Collins, supra note 11, at 31.  
 44. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 212. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 212-13.  
 47. Id. at 213. 
 48. See Larkin, supra note 15, at 34-35. 
 49. Tonya L. Brito, Spousal Support Takes on the Mommy Track: Why the ALI 
Proposal Is Good for Working Mothers, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 151, 153 (2001). 
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and the ability of the paying spouse to pay.”50 Courts generally 
awarded permanent alimony on a periodic or lump-sum basis51 until 
the supported spouse either remarried or died.52 Permanent alimony 
was a lifeline for many women who found themselves divorced with 
children to care for, no job, and no marketable skills. On the other 
hand, permanent alimony posed problems for divorced men who were 
forced to continue supporting their former spouses indefinitely, 
especially those men who chose to remarry and assume financial 
support for their new spouse. However, after the advent of no-fault 
divorce, permanent alimony fell out of favor because it interfered 
with the “free exit” from marriage allowed by the new no-fault 
divorce laws.53  
 The trend in spousal support law now is to award support 
payments for a limited period in order to force ex-spouses to become 
financially self-sufficient.54 Limited-duration awards arose in 
response to changing assumptions regarding the economic, cultural, 
and familial roles of men and women.55 Dividing marital property 
equally and awarding temporary support fosters a “clean break” 
between the spouses.56 Such a break could never be achieved if one 
spouse remained legally obligated to support the other indefinitely. 
                                                                                                                      
 50. Kelly L. DeGance, Note, “Savings Alimony”: The Struggle for Fairness in 
Permanent Alimony Awards, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 317, 318 (2001); see also Canakaris v. 
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980). The Florida Supreme Court held:  
 Permanent periodic alimony is used to provide the needs and the necessities 
of life to a former spouse as they have been established by the marriage of the 
parties. The two primary elements to be considered when determining 
permanent periodic alimony are the needs of one spouse for the funds and the 
ability of the other spouse to provide the necessary funds.  
Id. 
 51. Ho & Johnson, supra note 13, at 71-72. 
 52. Larkin, supra note 15, at 34-35. 
 53. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 12, at 119-20. Before no-fault divorce laws, parties to 
a marriage could only divorce upon a showing of fault. However, no-fault divorce allows 
either party to file for divorce for any or no reason. Legal economists have analogized 
marriage under new no-fault laws as a type of “employment-at-will” contract. Parties to 
such contracts may “exit without penalty, thereby vitiating any claim to damages for 
breach.” Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s 
Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 67-68 (1998).  
 54. Brito, supra note 49, at 154-55.  
 55. Larkin, supra note 15, at 35. Beginning in the 1970s, society’s assumptions 
regarding a woman’s inability to work and support herself began to change. As a result, 
society began to perceive women as able to obtain employment, able to earn enough money 
to be self-sufficient, and able to balance working with childcare responsibilities. Id.  
 56. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 214. 
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B.   Reimbursive and Compensatory Support: The Middle Systems 
 Reimbursive support was one of the first types of support to 
emerge after permanent alimony fell out of favor.57 This type of 
support was based on the theory that one spouse often chooses to 
invest his or her time and energy into the marriage believing it will 
help the other spouse’s career and eventually improve the quality of 
the marriage.58 However, if divorce occurs, this spouse is denied the 
future benefits his or her acts have ensured.59 In the past, courts 
awarded this type of alimony to reimburse these spouses for their 
“faithful service during marriage”60 while modern courts awarded 
this type of alimony to atone for the fact that they would never have 
the opportunity to enjoy the future benefits of their services.61 
 Compensatory support emerged more recently as part of the 
growing body of critical literature urging support awards based on 
compensation rather than the needs of the economically 
disadvantaged spouse.62 This model of support provides compensa-
tory payments for certain losses experienced at the time a marriage 
is dissolved.63 It is based on the theory that traditional marriage 
operates on a “gendered division of labor,” in which one spouse works 
outside the home and one spouse works inside the home.64 
Compensatory support recognizes that the market prospects of the 
spouse who works outside the home significantly improve while the 
market prospects of the spouse who works inside the home become 
substantially impaired.65 Instead of looking at the individual 
contributions of each spouse to the marriage, courts instead examine 
the couple’s married standard of living and use it as a baseline for 
determining the amount of the support payments, suggesting a right 
of each spouse to continue living as if the marriage had not ended.66 
                                                                                                                      
 57. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 146-49 (1985). 
 58. Murray, supra note 8, at 316. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (quoting HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 642 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Christopher D. Nelson, Note, Toward a Compensatory Model of Alimony in 
Alaska, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 101, 120-21 (1995). 
 63. Collins, supra note 11, at 45.  
 64. Nelson, supra note 62, at 120-21. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 12, at 120. 
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1.   Principles of the American Law Institute 
 The American Law Institute (ALI) endorses the compensatory 
alimony model.67 In its 1997 draft, the ALI’s objective in awarding 
alimony was to allocate financial losses upon divorce in the most 
predictable and equitable manner possible.68 Support should only be 
ordered in one of five narrow situations: (1) where one spouse in a 
long-term marriage experiences a decreased standard of living; (2) 
where one spouse experiences decreased earning capacity due to 
childcare responsibilities; (3) where one spouse experiences 
decreased earning capacity arising from the care of third parties; (4) 
where one spouse would experience an unfair lack of return for his or 
her investment in the other spouse’s earning capacity; and (5) where, 
after a brief marriage, one spouse needs to adjust to his or her 
inability to recover the premarital standard of living.69 If the court 
finds that a spouse satisfies any of these criteria and deserves 
compensation, the principles require the court to consider two factors 
in determining the amount of compensation that spouse should 
receive: the duration of the marriage and the economic disparity 
between the spouses at the time of divorce.70 The ALI principles are 
touted as very flexible, and they should not be used if a “substantial 
injustice” would result.71  
2.   The Likely Impact on Spousal Support if ALI’s Principles Are         
Adopted 
 If adopted, these principles could completely replace current 
spousal support laws,72 so it is important to understand their 
strengths and weaknesses. Proponents of the principles offer three 
advantages to their adoption. First, the principles would establish 
clear, percentage-based presumptions regarding the proper amount 
and duration of support awards.73 Second, they would produce results 
that are more equitable and would lead to greater uniformity among 
                                                                                                                      
 67. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 5 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]; 
see also Virginia R. Dugan & Jon A. Feder, Alimony Guidelines: Do They Work?, FAM. 
ADVOC., Spring 2003, at 20, 23.  
 68. Drefchinski, supra note 14, at 602; see also Brito, supra note 49, at 152 (“The 
drafters of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution have sought to bring certainty 
and fairness to this area of the law by transforming alimony from a need-based into an 
entitlement-based regime and dramatically reducing judicial discretion through imposition 
of guidelines for determining spousal support payments.”).  
 69. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 67, §§ 5.05, .06, .12, .15, .16. 
 70. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 209. Consideration of such factors may trigger a 
presumption that a support award is warranted. Id. 
 71. Id. at 209. 
 72. Id. at 208. 
 73. Garrison, supra note 7, at 129. 
510  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:501 
 
divorce cases and settlements.74 Finally, proponents argue that the 
principles would greatly improve the postdivorce situation of working 
parents by providing a mechanism for them to receive support if they 
have acted as the primary caretakers of their children during the 
marriage.75 This last advantage is based on the theory that although 
working parents do not completely forsake their careers to raise 
children, they inevitably suffer some loss in earning capacity or 
career advancement because of caretaking responsibilities, and such 
loss deserves compensation.76 
 Conversely, opponents of the ALI principles offer two 
disadvantages. First, the guidelines are too broad to permit 
consistent application.77 Ultimately, the presumptions created by the 
guidelines could have a stronger influence in some jurisdictions than 
in others.78 Second, the guidelines use the spouses’ standard of living 
experienced during marriage as a baseline for determining a 
reasonable support award.79 This baseline “presuppos[es] a right to 
live financially as though one continued to be married”80 which is 
problematic because it does not reflect the principle that spouses 
should have the right to make their life as a married couple come to 
an end.81 Other ALI proposals suggest differently and assume that 
the marriage had never occurred and effectively “erases” all decisions 
the couple made while married.82 This other ALI approach is 
problematic because spouses should share equally in the liabilities as 
well as the benefits of living together.83  
 Currently, the ALI principles remain mere principles—they have 
not yet been adopted by any of the states. Though the ideas 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Id. 
 75. Brito, supra note 49, at 151-52 (“According to the reporters, [the ALI] proposal is 
premised on two principles: first, that caretaking is the responsibility of both parents and, 
second, that the spouse who assumes a greater portion of caretaking during marriage 
should not bear the full cost of any resultant career damage.”).  
 76. Id. at 151-53. Section 5.06 of the ALI principles permits compensation for working 
parents whose postdivorce earning potentials are lower than they would have been if they 
had not assumed primary care of children during the marriage. However, this 
compensation is conditioned on two factors: (1) the children must have lived in the working 
parent’s household for a specific period of time, and (2) the working parent’s postdivorce 
earning capacity must be substantially lower than the earning capacity of the other 
spouse. Id. at 152-53. 
 77. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 210. See generally David Westfall, Unprincipled Family 
Dissolution: The American Law Institute’s Recommendations for Spousal Support and 
Division of Property, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 917 (2004) (arguing that the ALI 
recommendations fail to promote interstate uniformity). 
 78. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 210. 
 79. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 12, at 120. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 121. 
 83. Id. 
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contained in these principles are quite innovative in theory, it 
remains to be seen how well they would actually work in practice. 
C.   Rehabilitative Support: The Current Trend 
 As previously stated, the modern trend in spousal support law has 
shifted toward awarding rehabilitative support.84 The rationale 
behind rehabilitative support is very different from the rationale 
underlying reimbursive and compensatory support. It is not awarded 
to “reimburse” or to “compensate” a spouse for anything, and courts 
do not even consider the spouses’ premarital standards of living or 
contributions to the marriage when setting the amount of the 
award.85 Instead, rehabilitative support is awarded to help the 
financially impacted spouse obtain the skills, training, or education 
needed to become self-sufficient.86 It is based on the long-held judicial 
belief that support awards should reduce the economic disadvantages 
of divorce on the supported spouse.87 The presumption behind 
rehabilitation is that such training will eventually help the 
supported spouse obtain steady employment and learn to survive.88  
 Courts typically award rehabilitative support to spouses who have 
been denied the opportunity to pursue an education or a career due 
to family, childcare, and household responsibilities.89 In order to 
receive this type of award, the requesting spouse must demonstrate 
to the court that he or she has created definite rehabilitative goals, 
determined how to achieve such goals, and calculated the amount of 
rehabilitation necessary to become self-sufficient.90 Rehabilitative 
support is not awarded if the requesting spouse cannot convince the 
court of its necessity.91 Such proof is necessary to ensure that people 
will not misuse their support payments. Like other types of support, 
courts should exercise discretion in determining the amount of 
rehabilitation awarded.92 To determine the amount and duration of 
                                                                                                                      
 84. Id. at 119. 
 85. Id. at 122-23. 
 86. Id. at 122; Murray, supra note 8, at 317.  
 87. Murray, supra note 8, at 317.  
 88. Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1986) (stating that “rehabilitative 
alimony is properly limited to job training or other means directly related to the end of 
securing for one party a source of earned income”).  
 89. Lyle & Levy, supra note 10, at 12. 
 90. Ho & Johnson, supra note 13, at 72-73. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court 
strongly encouraged a divorcee seeking rehabilitative support to submit “a cost estimate of 
the rehabilitative plan, as well as an approximation of the economic benefit that is 
expected. It is necessary that the person receiving rehabilitative alimony will improve 
employability as a result of the plan.” Ulsher v. Ulsher, 867 P.2d 819, 822 n.5 (Alaska 
1994). 
 91. See Nelson, supra note 62, at 107-08. Rehabilitative support should also be denied 
to spouses who intend to use the money for purposes other than education or training. Id. 
 92. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 12, at 123. 
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rehabilitative support, courts should balance the needs of the 
disadvantaged spouse against the desire to minimize the burden on 
the spouse forced to pay for those needs.93 Luckily for the supporting 
spouse, rehabilitative support is usually temporary—it ends when 
the supported spouse has had time to become self-sufficient and self-
supporting.94 Upon reaching these goals, there is no further legal 
duty for the supporting spouse to continue paying.95  
D.   Reorientation and Bridge-the-Gap Support 
 Another type of support, known as reorientation, may be awarded 
in combination with rehabilitation support.96 This type of support is 
designed to “allow the requesting spouse an opportunity to adjust to 
the changed financial circumstances accompanying a divorce.”97 It is 
typically awarded only in cases where the division of the couple’s 
property does not adequately satisfy the immediate needs of one 
spouse.98 Reorientation is inherently transitional, typically lasting for 
a maximum of one year,99 or until recipients have had an opportunity 
to “reorient” themselves to single life. This type of support helps the 
recipient pay the bills while undergoing rehabilitation training or 
education. 
 A few states, including Florida, recognize a newly emerging form 
of support known as bridge-the-gap.100 Bridge-the-gap support 
consists of periodic payments intended to assist a needy spouse with 
short-term basic living needs.101 Such support is most helpful when 
                                                                                                                      
 93. Id. 
 94. Murray, supra note 8, at 317. 
 95. Rehabilitative support awards typically are paid for the duration of the recipient’s 
estimated rehabilitation plan or for a reasonable amount of time determined by the court. 
Otherwise, recipients could take advantage of the system by creating rehabilitation plans 
that endure indefinitely. See Nelson, supra note 62, at 107-08. 
 96. Id. at 110-11. 
 97. Id. at 110 (quoting Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1215 n.6 (Alaska 
1989)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Green v. Green, 672 
So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Jesse J. Bennett, Jr., Bridge-the-Gap Alimony: An 
Emerging Vehicle for Satisfying Short-Term Need, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1999, at 65, 65.    
 101. Ho & Johnson, supra note 13, at 72. For example, in one case, the Florida Fourth 
District Court of Appeal ordered a wealthy older husband to pay his younger, less wealthy 
wife $1,000 per month in rehabilitative support for six months. Murray v. Murray, 374 So. 
2d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). The court held that this “short period of rehabilitative alimony 
[was] sufficient to allow the wife to ‘bridge’ the gap between the high standard of living 
enjoyed during the brief marriage and the more modest standard that the wife can provide 
for herself.” Id. at 624. In another case, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal held 
that a wife was not entitled to more than $1,000 per month for eighteen months from her 
husband after the demise of their ten-year marriage because she was employed, possessed 
adequate job skills, and did not need rehabilitation “other than to ease her transition from 
a married to a single status.” Iribar v. Iribar, 510 So. 2d 1023, 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). 
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the divorcing couple does not possess sufficient assets that can be 
sold for support money or when one spouse requires help 
transitioning from a married to a single status.102 It is not designed to 
help rehabilitate the spouse—just to take care of his or her 
immediate needs. Bridge-the-gap awards must be reasonable and are 
based on the supporting spouse’s ability to pay,103 so these awards 
may appear more fair than other types of awards because they are 
neither rehabilitative nor compensatory in nature.  
E.   Property Division in Lieu of Spousal Support? 
 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, created in 1970 and 
amended in 1971 and 1973, actively opposes spousal support.104 
According to the drafters, the goal of the Act is to: 
[E]ncourage the court to provide for the financial needs of the 
spouses by property disposition rather than by an award of 
maintenance. Only if the available property is insufficient for the 
purpose and if the spouse who seeks maintenance is unable to secure 
employment appropriate to his skills and interests or is occupied 
with childcare may an award of maintenance be ordered.105 
The Act provides several factors to help courts determine reasonable 
support awards, such as the requesting party’s financial resources 
and apportionment of the marital property.106 Clearly, the rationale 
behind the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act’s model of support is 
that it should not be awarded in most cases. So far, this model has 
only been adopted by eight states.107 Thus, it remains a minority 
perspective.  
IV.   CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH SPOUSAL SUPPORT LAW 
 Although all fifty states have some type of spousal support system 
in operation,108 support remains a very controversial and problematic 
area of the law. Most likely, the controversy over support stems 
                                                                                                                      
 102. Ho & Johnson, supra note 13, at 72. 
 103. Id. 
 104. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308 (amended 1971, 1973), 9A U.L.A. 446 
(1998).   
 105. Id. § 308, 9A U.L.A. cmt. at 447.  
 106. Id. § 308(b), 9A U.L.A. at 446. Other factors include the requesting party’s ability 
to meet his or her needs independently, childcare responsibilities of the requesting party, 
amount of time needed for the requesting party to receive education and training needed to 
obtain employment, standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, duration of the 
marriage, age and physical and emotional condition of the requesting party, and the ability 
of the supporting spouse to pay support and still satisfy his or her own needs. Id.  
 107. Drefchinski, supra note 14, at 585. The eight states that have adopted the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act are Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, and Washington. Id. 
 108. Collins, supra note 11, at 31. 
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largely from the fact that there is no accepted legal theory to explain 
why one spouse should have to continue financially supporting “the 
other after their marriage has been legally terminated.”109 Although 
courts, scholars, and many divorced couples are well aware and in 
agreement as to the problems inherent in this area of the law, a 
universal and comprehensive solution has yet to be adopted. The 
following subsections outline some of the most widely recognized 
problems inherent in spousal support law. 
A.   Spousal Support Law Lacks Consistency 
 The first, and arguably most serious, problem with spousal 
support law is that the law varies considerably among jurisdictions 
and even within any single jurisdiction. Such inconsistency may 
encourage forum shopping and increase litigation. Support law has 
been described as “vague, complex and highly discretionary”110 and 
“neither predictable, accurate, satisfactory, nor fair.”111 
 For example, ten states currently have no statutory guidance to 
aid courts in determining support awards.112 Obviously, judges in 
these states exercise considerable discretion over support sums. Such 
discretion has “led to few awards, and, in the cases where awards are 
granted, unpredictable and inconsistent results.”113 When presented 
with the same set of facts, a judge in one court could arrive at a 
completely different support award than a judge in another court 
within the same jurisdiction.  
 In the remaining forty states, the situation is not much better. In 
these states, courts are required to consider specific statutory factors 
or guidelines in determining the amount and duration of support 
awards.114 Spousal support guidelines evolved from child support 
                                                                                                                      
 109. Perry, supra note 21, at 24. 
 110. Garrison, supra note 7, at 119 (quoting Marsha Garrison, The Economic 
Consequences of Divorce, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 10, 22 (1994)). 
 111. Collins, supra note 11, at 23. 
 112. Id. at 32. The ten states are Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming. In these states, courts 
abide by a general rule to award an amount that is “just or necessary under the 
circumstances.” Id. at 78 tbl.I(A).  
 113. Kapalla, supra note 18, at 208. 
 114. For example, Florida’s alimony statute lists seven factors to be considered in 
determining alimony awards. These factors include the following: (a) standard of living 
during the marriage, (b) duration of the marriage, (c) age, physical, and emotional 
conditions of the parties, (d) financial resources of the parties, including the nonmarital 
assets, marital assets, and liabilities distributed to each, (e) when applicable, the time 
necessary for the parties to obtain education or training needed to find appropriate 
employment, (f) contribution of each party to the marriage, such as homemaking, childcare 
services, educational assistance, and career building of the other party, and (g) all sources 
of income available to the parties. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (2004). Furthermore, the 
guidelines in nearly all states require consideration of factors such as duration of the 
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guidelines after states witnessed how successful the guidelines and 
formulas were in arriving at reasonable child support awards.115 
Supposedly, these guidelines would make support awards more 
predictable, decrease hostility and negative feelings between parties, 
and reduce litigation costs.116 
 But have these statutory guidelines actually achieved their 
intended goals? Most critics would agree that they have not. 
Currently, at least three major complaints are circulating about 
these guidelines. First, the guidelines appear simple to apply, but 
upon closer inspection, are too “broad, idiosyncratic, or unclear in 
purpose or direction.”117 Promulgating lists of factors to consider is 
not very helpful without clear rules for their application.118 Second, 
the guidelines do not help quantify the actual monetary value of an 
award. The amount of the award is left to judicial discretion,119 and 
that can result in unreasonable or inconsistent awards.120 Third, 
there is no evidence demonstrating that statutory guidelines are 
even the best method to help courts determine spousal support 
awards—the process can never be completely objective because 
judicial discretion is still required to take into account special 
circumstances in determining awards.121 Awarding a fair and 
reasonable amount of support requires judges to make “critical 
financial decisions . . . which are impossible to ascertain with any 
degree of certainty,”122 such as approximations of past expenses, 
estimations of future expenses, and speculations as to future 
incomes.123  
                                                                                                                      
marriage, needs of the former spouses, and childcare responsibilities. See Garrison, supra 
note 7, at 129. 
 115. Dugan & Feder, supra note 67, at 20. States that have adopted their own 
guidelines include Arizona, California, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. Id. at 20-22. Additionally, many other 
states are considering the use of alimony guidelines. See Victoria M. Ho & Jennifer J. 
Cohen, An Update on Florida Alimony Case Law: Are Alimony Guidelines a Part of Our 
Future? Part II, FLA. B.J., Nov. 2003, at 85, 85. 
 116. Dugan & Feder, supra note 67, at 23. 
 117. Collins, supra note 11, at 32. 
 118. Id. at 25. 
 119. See Victoria M. Ho & Jennifer J. Cohen, An Update on Florida Alimony Case Law: 
Are Alimony Guidelines a Part of Our Future? Part I, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2003, at 79 (discussing 
problems with Florida’s statutory guidelines). 
 120. See Collins, supra note 11, at 32-33. 
 121. See Garrison, supra note 7, at 123 (“[T]he achievement of equitable outcomes 
when families break up cannot be achieved either through broad grants of discretion, or 
even through the substitution of rules for discretionary standards.”). 
 122. Collins, supra note 11, at 25. (“Even if future expenses and incomes could be 
determined within a tolerable margin of error, the figures presented for purposes of 
support negotiations or litigation often are the result of strategic posturing rather than 
accurate projections, and provide an inherently unreliable basis for decisionmaking.”). 
 123. Id. 
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B.   Devastating Effects of Spousal Support Law on Women 
 Another serious problem of spousal support law is its negative 
effect on divorced women. Despite the tremendous advances women 
have achieved in the workforce in the last half century, the 
unfortunate reality remains that women are less economically 
advantaged than men.124 Nowhere does such disadvantage readily 
appear than after a man and woman divorce. But before describing 
the effects of modern spousal support law on women, it is important 
to provide some background information comparing the effects of 
divorce on men and women.125 
 Much research demonstrates the negative impact of divorce on 
modern women.126 Despite the idealistic notion that men and women 
are on “equal footing” while they remain married, “a vast amount of 
literature shows that women are financially disadvantaged, relative 
to men, in marriage,”127 and they definitely do not exit marriage on 
equal footing.128 Women remain economically disadvantaged during 
divorce and encounter significant hardships after divorce.129 Why do 
women fare so poorly after divorcing? The answer depends on several 
related factors.  
                                                                                                                      
 124. See generally ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER 
INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (1999) 
(discussing gender-based wage discrimination); B. Tobias Isbell, Gender Inequality and 
Wage Differentials Between the Sexes: Is It Inevitable or Is There an Answer?, 50 WASH. U. 
J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 369 (1996) (discussing lower wages for women in similar fields as 
men); Robert Nelson, Law, Markets, and Gender Inequality in Pay, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S 
L.J. 61 (1995) (discussing wage discrimination within government). 
 125. It is important to note that some women are economically self-sufficient at the 
time of divorce, and some women successfully overcome the obstacles they face postdivorce. 
Unfortunately, these women are the minority. See Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s 
Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 
1168-69 (1999). 
 126. For instance, a 1976 Michigan study by Saul Hoffman and John Holmes 
demonstrated that a man’s standard of living increased by 17% after divorce while a 
woman’s standard of living fell by 29%. See SAUL HOFFMAN & JOHN HOLMES, HUSBANDS, 
WIVES AND DIVORCE (1976). Lenore Weitzman’s groundbreaking 1978 California study 
demonstrated the devastating economic effects of no-fault divorce on women. The study 
showed that after divorce, a man’s standard of living generally increased by 42% while a 
woman’s standard of living generally decreased by 73%. WEITZMAN, supra note 57, at 323. 
Heather Wishik’s 1982-1983 Vermont study demonstrated that a man’s per capita income 
increased 120% after divorce while a woman’s per capita income decreased 33% after 
divorce. Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 
79, 97 (1986). A 1987 Alaskan study by Barbara Baker demonstrated that divorced women 
and their children experienced a 33% decline in per capita income while divorced men 
experienced a 17% increase in per capita income. BARBARA BAKER, FAMILY EQUITY AT 
ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN, 
at i (1987).  
 127. Engel, supra note 1, at 310. 
 128. Penelope E. Bryan, Symposium, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 713, 713 (2000).  
 129. Id. 
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 First, men and women contribute to their marriages very 
differently. For instance, men generally invest in their marriages by 
advancing their careers and increasing their earning potential.130 
These investments pay off much later in the marriage in the form of 
a higher standard of living for both partners.131 Conversely, women 
typically invest in their marriages early on by assuming primary 
child and home care responsibilities, which pay off immediately in 
the form of a higher standard of home life for both partners.132 
Unfortunately, such responsibilities often require women to forgo 
working outside the home and increasing their earning potential.133 
The difference in the way men and women contribute to their 
marriages permits men to benefit early on from their wives’ 
contributions to their earning potential and home life, whereas it 
takes women far longer to benefit from their husbands’ wage-earning 
contributions.134  
 Second, because women typically assume the primary 
responsibility for home and childcare, they often put their careers on 
hold or place more emphasis on their husbands’ careers than on their 
own.135 As the marriage endures, the woman’s market value 
decreases as the man’s market value increases.136 Unfortunately, this 
disparity in market value causes women to become economically 
dependent upon their husbands.137 When the marriage fails, these 
women find themselves newly single, frequently with custody of their 
children, and with few marketable skills to help support themselves 
and their families.138 
 Third, as a consequence of possessing few marketable skills, many 
divorced women experience “difficulty finding work, remain trapped 
in low-paying jobs, and/or work two jobs to survive.”139 Poverty makes 
it difficult for divorced women to afford the training and education 
they need to improve their job skills and increase their earning 
capacity.140 After a while, financial difficulties begin to impact the 
                                                                                                                      
 130. Ertman, supra note 53, at 69. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 69-70 (discussing how wives provide a source of income while husbands 
attend school). 
 135. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 365. 
 136. Ertman, supra note 53, at 69-70. 
 137. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 365. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Bryan, supra note 128, at 714; see also Bryan, supra note 125, at 1165-66. 
Additionally, divorced women also face traditional gender discrimination in the workforce. 
Gender discrimination is compounded by age discrimination if the divorced woman is older 
and has not worked for an extended period due to homemaking and childcare. Ertman, 
supra note 53, at 30-31.  
 140. Bryan, supra note 125, at 1165-66. 
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physical and mental health of divorced women and consequently, 
their parenting skills.141 Remarriage often represents the best 
method for divorced women to achieve economic stability, although 
age and number of children may diminish their prospects for 
remarrying.142  
 Clearly, women lose more in divorce than just their husbands—
they also lose their economic security. Ever since the advent of “no-
fault” divorce law, women have been significantly adversely affected 
by divorce.143 Under the traditional fault-based system of divorce 
law,144 courts determined which spouse was at fault for the demise of 
the marriage and ordered that spouse to pay the innocent spouse, 
usually the wife, an award of financial support.145 Fault-based 
divorce law had advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, 
it decreased the devastating financial impact of divorce on women. If 
a husband was found at fault for the demise of the marriage, the wife 
received a larger property settlement and support award.146 On the 
negative side, fault-based divorce law caused significant hostility 
between couples, because they were forced to testify before the court 
about private marital affairs. No-fault divorce law was enacted to 
alleviate the hostilities traditionally associated with divorce by 
making it easier for couples to separate and by promoting equality 
through equal distribution of the marital assets.147 The most 
significant difference between the two systems is that spousal 
support was considered a right under fault-based divorce but is 
considered only a “conditional means of support” under no-fault 
divorce.148 Despite its good intentions, no-fault divorce law and its 
accompanying rationale of conditional spousal support have caused 
the postdivorce economic situations of women to considerably 
                                                                                                                      
 141. Id. at 1167. 
 142. Ertman, supra note 53, at 30. 
 143. See Jane Biondi, Note, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform 
Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 615 
(1999).  
 144. Until 1968, most states did not permit couples to obtain a divorce unless they 
could establish that one partner to the marriage was at “fault” for its demise. Traditional 
fault grounds included adultery, desertion, abandonment, and physical or mental cruelty. 
Id. at 613.  
 145. Ertman, supra note 53, at 33 (stating that alimony was awarded “as a kind of 
damages for the other spouse’s misconduct”). This financial award was designed to serve as 
punishment for the partner at fault and as a deterrent against future marital wrongdoing. 
Drefchinski, supra note 14, at 583. 
 146. Biondi, supra note 143, at 621.  
 147. Phyllis D. Coontz, Alimony Awards and the Search for Equity in the No-Fault 
Divorce Era, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 103, 103 (1995). “The gender-neutral language of no-fault 
divorce laws, equitable property division schemes and equality-based support awards did 
not translate into equal results for men and women.” Biondi, supra note 143, at 615.  
 148. Coontz, supra note 147, at 104.  
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decline.149 No longer are women guaranteed support payments, 
regardless of their postdivorce financial condition. 
C.   Spousal Support Law Is Often Unjust 
 Another problem with the spousal support system is that 
recipients can take advantage of the law in several ways. 
Unfortunately, society’s general perception of the entire system of 
spousal support is often negatively colored by a small number of 
recipients who misuse it. 
 The first way that support recipients may misuse the system is by 
choosing not to remarry in order to continue receiving support 
payments. In most states, spousal support ends automatically upon 
the recipient’s remarriage,150 but in many states, it does not 
automatically end upon the recipient’s cohabitation.151 If presented 
with evidence that a recipient is cohabiting, most jurisdictions will 
only modify the recipient’s support payments if he or she has 
experienced “changed economic circumstances.”152 Such circum-
stances include, for instance, if the recipient is financially supporting 
the cohabitant or the cohabitant is financially supporting the 
recipient.153 Thus, some support recipients may choose to reside with 
new significant others rather than get remarried in order to continue 
collecting support payments.154 Although a major difference between 
spouses and cohabitants is that cohabitants do not assume legal 
duties of support and service toward each other, when two 
romantically involved partners choose to live together, they 
constructively assume mutual duties of support and service toward 
each other. Due to these constructive duties of support, it makes 
little sense for courts to continue requiring people to support former 
spouses who are now being supported by others. 
 More outrageously, it is possible for a person to commit adultery, 
physical abuse, or mental abuse and still be awarded spousal 
support.155 Although marital misconduct serves as a complete bar to 
spousal support in a few jurisdictions,156 other jurisdictions only 
                                                                                                                      
 149. See id.  
 150. Collins, supra note 11, at 26. 
 151. See Sara Z. Moghadam, Dismissing the Purpose and Public Policy Surrounding 
Spousal Support, 56 MD. L. REV. 927, 931-32 (1997). 
 152. Id. at 931. 
 153. Id. at 931-32. 
 154. See Gordon v. Gordon, 675 A.2d 540 (Md. 1996); Meyer v. Meyer, 394 A.2d 1220 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978). 
 155. See Joanna Grossman, Can an Adulterer Receive Alimony?, FINDLAW, May 19, 
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/05/05/grossman.adultery.alimony. 
 156. Spain, supra note 34, at 866; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1(b) (West, Westlaw 
through 2005 Special Sess.) (“A party shall not be entitled to alimony if it is established by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the separation between the parties was caused by 
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include misconduct among numerous factors to be considered in 
support determinations.157 A few jurisdictions now recognize that 
marital misconduct (especially abuse) may increase the economic 
needs and expenses of one spouse,158 usually in the form of medical or 
counseling bills. Courts in these jurisdictions will consider the 
physical and mental condition of the abused spouse regarding his or 
her health, financial condition, and market prospects in determining 
the amount of a support award.159 However, those twenty states 
classified as no-fault consider only a spouse’s financial misconduct 
when determining the amount of a support award.160 In these states, 
marital misconduct is not considered because it “is often difficult to 
assess and [may] introduce[] issues collateral to financial need and 
ability” of the supporting spouse to pay.161 Thus, spouses who are 
victims of serious physical abuse are left to seek tort remedies 
instead, such as lawsuits for battery.162 Unfortunately for spouses 
who are victims of adultery, mental abuse, and less serious or 
frequent physical abuse, tort remedies are less likely to succeed.163 
Clearly, most people would agree that being forced to pay support 
money to a spouse who has been abusive or has committed adultery 
constitutes a great injustice. 
                                                                                                                      
that party’s adultery or desertion.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(a) (West, Westlaw through 
2005 Regular Sess.) (“If the court finds that the dependant spouse participated in an act of 
illicit sexual behavior . . . during the marriage and prior to or on the date of separation, the 
court shall not award alimony.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130(a) (West, Westlaw through 
2005 Regular Sess.) (“No alimony may be awarded a spouse who commits adultery before 
the earliest of these two events: (1) the formal signing of a written property or marital 
settlement agreement or (2) entry of a permanent order of separate maintenance and 
support or of a permanent order approving a property or marital settlement agreement 
between the parties.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(B) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Regular 
Sess.) (Courts may deny permanent support to spouses who have committed adultery 
unless “the court determines from clear and convincing evidence, that a denial of support 
and maintenance would constitute a manifest injustice, based upon the respective degrees 
of fault during the marriage and the relative economic circumstances of the parties.”).  
 157. Spain, supra note 34, at 866-67; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (2004) (“The court 
may consider the adultery of either spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining 
the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded.”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(b)(14) (West, 
Westlaw through Act 2005-96) (“In determining whether alimony is necessary and in 
determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony, the court 
shall consider all relevant factors, including . . . [t]he marital misconduct of either of the 
parties during the marriage.”). 
 158. Catherine Mazzeo, Note, Rodriguez v. Rodriguez: Fault as a Determinative Factor 
in Alimony Awards in Nevada and Other Community Property Jurisdictions, 2 NEV. L.J. 
177, 182-83 (2002). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Westfall, supra note 77, at 931-32.    
 161. Spain, supra note 34, at 865. 
 162. Westfall, supra note 77, at 934-35. 
 163. Id. Westfall states that “tort remedies may be adequate in most states for serious 
physical injury, but are less likely to be provided for adultery or other sources of emotional 
distress.” Id.  
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D.   Spousal Support Orders May Be a Form of Involuntary Servitude 
 Some scholars have suggested that forcing one spouse to support 
the other after divorce is “peonage” or “involuntary servitude.”164 It is 
understandable that few divorced people want to keep paying their 
hard earned money for the support of a person they no longer wish to 
be united with. Now that the purpose of support has shifted from 
paying for the immediate physical needs of an ex-spouse to paying for 
the educational and vocational rehabilitation of that spouse, 
divorcees are even more likely to resent paying it.165 Yet, courts 
continue ordering people to support their ex-spouses. It has been 
argued that spousal support should be declared involuntary 
servitude that is unlawful under the Thirteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.166 However, the United States Supreme 
Court has not yet addressed this issue, and if it did, it would most 
likely declare spousal support an exception to the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude because of its 
public importance and the weight of authority already existing in 
this area of the law.167 
 Even if spousal support is not a form of involuntary servitude, it 
at least burdens a person’s ability to obtain a divorce. The purpose of 
no-fault divorce was to remove the barriers preventing couples from 
exiting their marital unions.168 But requiring one partner to support 
the other for the rest of his or her life (or at least until remarriage) 
may make exiting the marriage too costly for some people, 
contradicting the entire rationale behind no-fault divorce.  
V.   PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
PROBLEM 
 As demonstrated in the previous section of this Comment, 
significant problems exist with spousal support law as it exists today. 
There is no legal basis for requiring someone to continue supporting 
his or her former spouse, especially one with no childcare 
responsibilities or health problems that prohibit employment. 
Everybody resents making support payments, the system is often 
taken advantage of, and the mere existence of spousal support 
contributes to society’s negative image of women as helpless and 
dependent on men. So why do legislatures and courts continue to 
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maintain the system? Perhaps more importantly, should legislatures 
and courts continue to maintain the system? 
 Despite all its problems, few scholars suggest that the entire 
system of spousal support should be abolished169—eliminating 
support would cause a huge number of divorcees to become destitute 
and forced to rely on family members, friends, and the government 
for financial support. Even critics who strongly oppose the system 
believe it should be preserved but reformed.170 Perhaps that is the 
best solution—retain the general system of spousal support but 
rework its details. Divorce law needs a new support system whereby 
courts can order the more economically advantaged spouse to 
temporarily assist the less advantaged spouse’s basic needs without 
imposing too large of a burden and without sacrificing the supporting 
spouse’s own standard of living.  
 This new system of spousal support should not be based on either 
compensation or rehabilitation because both models are problematic. 
For instance, analogizing support payments to compensation for the 
needier spouse’s contributions to the marriage ignores the 
contributions of the economically advantaged spouse. Although both 
partners invested in their marriage differently, they both invested 
equally, so it is unfair to compensate only one spouse. The marital 
contributions of the wealthier spouse should not be ignored because 
he or she exits the marriage with better financial prospects. Thus, 
courts should abandon the use of support based on compensation. 
Furthermore, the new system of spousal support should not be based 
on the rehabilitation theory either because that theory carries the 
burden of the supporting spouse too far. A person should not be 
forced to pay for the education or vocational training of a person to 
whom he or she no longer wishes to be married. Awarding 
rehabilitation money for education and training assumes there exists 
some type of “right” to these amenities, when in fact there is no such 
right. If the needier spouse wishes to request rehabilitative support, 
he or she should be required to prove that, but for the marriage, he 
or she would have already obtained the education now sought. To 
accomplish this burden, the requesting spouse could demonstrate to 
the court that he or she was accepted or enrolled into a college, 
graduate school, or vocational school, but that due to the marriage, 
the education was postponed. Without such proof, an award of 
rehabilitative support places too much of a burden on the supporting 
spouse. 
 Instead of basing this new system of spousal support on the 
compensation or rehabilitation theories, the court should base 
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support on a temporary basic needs model. The temporary basic 
needs model would focus on supporting the immediate, physical 
needs of the recipient spouse, such as shelter, food, clothing, and 
medical care. Under this rationale, the less economically advantaged 
spouse will not become destitute following divorce, and the wealthier 
spouse will not be required to assume total responsibility for 
someone else’s future. In determining the monetary value of support 
awards, courts should still use traditional statutory guidelines and 
judicial discretion, but the primary determinant of the award’s value 
should be the supporting spouses’ own needs, salary, and ability to 
make payments without sacrificing their own standards of living and 
without compromising their future abilities to assume responsibility 
for new spouses and children. Most importantly, support payments 
under this new system would only be temporary. Awards should last 
no longer than one or two years. This period constitutes a sufficiently 
reasonable period of time for the recipient spouse to adjust to his or 
her newly single status, but not long enough for him or her to become 
accustomed to such payments. Payments should end immediately if 
the recipient remarries, cohabitates, or attains steady employment 
prior to the cut-off date.  
 Although no system of spousal support will ever be perfect, a good 
system will balance the needs of the supported spouse against the 
burden on the supporting spouse and will ensure that the negative 
effects of divorce are imposed equally on both partners to the 
marriage.171 Spousal support should be a temporary measure. It 
should not be a way of life the recipient can rely on forever and not a 
responsibility for which the paying spouse remains indefinitely 
obligated. 
VI.   COMMENT ON PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS THAT WAIVE RIGHTS TO 
SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
 Before concluding this Comment, it is important to recognize the 
increasing popularity of premarital agreements and the possible 
impact they may have on spousal support law. The use of premarital 
agreements has become widespread in the last few decades.172 In the 
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past, courts traditionally did not enforce premarital agreements 
because they were considered to violate public policy and were 
believed to promote divorce.173 However, most states will now honor 
premarital contracts that were properly entered into.174  
 Currently, a handful of states are also permitting couples to 
include provisions in their premarital agreements that opt out of 
spousal support obligations in the event that their marriages end in 
divorce.175 But should states enforce such provisions? On one hand, 
supporters of such provisions argue that courts should recognize the 
rights of couples to contract regarding any aspect of their marriages, 
including the ability to circumvent spousal support obligations.176 On 
the other hand, opponents argue that such provisions should not be 
enforced because women are frequently coerced into signing 
premarital agreements and because women often do not understand 
the ramifications of releasing their spouses from future support 
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obligations.177 Thus, women will end up signing agreements that 
place them at extreme economic disadvantage while sheltering their 
spouses’ income in the event of divorce.178  
 Ultimately, such provisions in premarital contracts should be 
enforced as long as both parties are fully informed of the advantages 
and disadvantages of contracting out of support obligations and as 
long as the contracts are fair and conscionable and signed under the 
required circumstances. Courts should enforce contracts made by 
consenting adults, even those agreements that exempt one party 
from future legal obligations.  
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 As this Comment has suggested, spousal support is one of the 
most contentious and problematic areas of the law, and nobody can 
agree on the best way to reform it. Some critics of support argue that 
people whose economic conditions are destroyed by divorce should 
“get over it” and learn to move on, including finding employment 
immediately and becoming self-sufficient. Unfortunately, this 
solution is not a reality for most divorcees, especially women. 
Childcare responsibilities, lack of marketable skills, and no economic 
safety net make postdivorce adjustment difficult. Other critics argue 
that some married persons make conscious decisions to remain at 
home and raise children rather than participate in the workforce, so 
in the event of divorce, these people must face the economic 
consequences of their choice. However, if married people faced the 
possibility that divorce could render them penniless, many would be 
forced to forgo their desired homemaker lifestyles and would instead 
seek employment to ensure a steady source of income. Although such 
a choice may benefit these people in the event of divorce, it limits the 
time they can spend on childcare and household responsibilities. Yet, 
other critics argue that divorcees should not be treated any 
differently from other needy persons, and thus, the burden of their 
financial support should fall on society, not on their former spouses. 
However, it makes more sense to place the burden of such support on 
a former spouse rather than on society as a whole because the 
marriage contract creates a special relationship and obligations 
between its parties that cannot be wholly severed upon the contract’s 
termination. Clearly, many problems exist in this area of the law, as 
well as a vast number of different perspectives. 
 Ultimately, the purpose of spousal support is to equally distribute 
the negative financial consequences of divorce on both spouses, so as 
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not to devastate one of them. When a marriage breaks up, both 
spouses are forced to readjust to single life, including finding new 
living accommodations, obtaining employment, and caring for 
children. If one spouse exits the marriage with little money and no 
employment prospects, he or she will have an extremely difficult 
time with this readjustment. For this reason, the law proscribes the 
system of spousal support. Although the system is imperfect and 
often leads to unpredictable and inconsistent results, it remains the 
only method by which many economically disadvantaged divorcees 
can survive. Ultimately, spousal support laws should be retained but 
reformed to eliminate the problems that cause these laws to be so 
controversial. 
